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LAKE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS WITH
PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS:
SELECTED PROBLEMS FOR LOT OWNERS
JOHN G. VOGEL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfaction with urban housing and living conditions, a height-
ened interest in ecology, the demand for outlets to spend increased
leisure time, and the desire to turn a quick profit are among the
factors contributing to the tremendous land boom of recent years.'
To fulfill the need for new housing and leisure time outlets, numerous
land developers are making public offerings of an increasingly com-
plex variety of residential, commercial and recreational facilities.
One type of development is the recreational lake community. The
developer buys a large tract of land, creates one or more artificial
lakes, and subdivides the remainder into lots. The developer then
sells individual parcels to purchasers wishing to build a new or a
second home. The buyer may desire access to recreational facilities
or may simply wish to hold the land for investment purposes.
The artificial lake communities that provide the focus of this Note
have several common characteristics: a corporate developer who began
the project; a subsequently formed property owners' association; 2 and
* A.B., 1968; J.D., Washington University, 1974.
I. See R. BuRBY, LAKE-ORIENTED SUBDIVISIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA: DEci-
,MON FACTORS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN GROWTH PATTERNS: DE-
VrLOPER DEcisioNs (1967).
2. A property owners' association is "an organization of home owners residing
within a particular development whose major purpose is to maintain and provide
community facilities for the common enjoyment of the residents." URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, THE HoM Es ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 5 (rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as HANDBOOK]. (All materials quoted and cited from the HANDBOOx are reprinted
from Technical Bulletin 50 Homes Association Handbook with permission from
ULI-the Urban Land Institute, 1200 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036.
Copyright 1964, revised 1970.) The Urban Land Institute distinguishes types of
homes associations on the basis of mandatory membership and payment of assess-
ments. The Institute further distinguishes other types of residential/organizational
structures such as condominiums, co-operatives, trusteeships, municipal corporations,
and special districts. Id. at 6-13.
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a single-family dwelling unit format. While similar difficulties are
also experienced in New Towns3 or planned unit developments, 4 this
Note is limited to the key problems of lake community developments.5
I. Tm LEGAL BAsIs OF THE PRoPERTY OwNERs' ASSOCIATION
A property owners' association (POA) is typically the culmination
of the developer's activities in creating a new lake community devel-
opment.6 The POA serves not only as a private mechanism for pro-
viding community services and facilities, but also as the entity to
which the developer will shift his remaining property interests and
control before disengaging himself from the project.7 It is important
to understand the legal foundation upon which a POA rests before
an analysis of its functions can be undertaken.
The primary function of the POA is to provide services necessary
3. The terms "New Town" and "new community" have been used interchange-
ably. They have been defined as "large-scale developments constructed under
single or unified management, following a fairly precise, inclusive plan and in-
cluding different types of housing, commercial and cultural facilities, and ameni-
ties sufficient to serve ... residents .... They may provide land for industry...
or offer ... employment opportunities eventually achiev[ing] a considerable meas-
ure of self-sufficiency." U.S. Anvisony COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, URBAN AND RURAL AMERICA 64 (1968). One author has stated that,
"The 'true' New Town ... is not only large in terms of population and geograph.
ical area, but attempts to reflect the full diversity of urban life, providing a mix-
ture of jobs, housing and recreation which will appeal to the widest possible
range of people." Comment, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Pri-
vate Government, 36 U. CHL L. Rnv. 379-80 (1969) [hereinafter cited as New
Towns].
4. "Planned unit development" means an area of land, controlled by a
landowner, to be developed as a single entity for a number of dwelling units,
and commercial and industrial use, density, lot coverage and required open
space to the regulations established in any one or more districts created,
from time to time, under the provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance
enacted pursuant to the conventional zoning enabling act of the state.
U.S. ADVISoRY COMm'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ACIR STATE LEO-
ISLATI PROGRAM 31-36-00 at 5 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
5. For a discussion of consumer fraud in lake community developments see M.
PAULSON, THE GREAT LAND HUSTLE (1972); THE ROCKEFELLER BROS. FUND,
THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (W. Reilly
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as THE USE oF LAND]; D. TYmON, AMERICA FOR
SALE (1973). For remedies that have been developed to protect purchasers see
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970); Morris,
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and Evaluation, 24 S.C.L.
REv. 331 (1972).
6. HANDBOOK 5.
7. Id.
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LAKE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS
to the community's continued existence and to maintain the common
open spaces and facilities that make life in such a community enjoy-
able." To insure successful provision of services and maintenance of
amenities, a mechanism is needed to provide control that is permanent
and effective, yet flexible enough to allow for future change. Based
on a study of numerous subdivisions purporting to have some form of
ownership control, the Urban Land Institute has concluded that the
future success or failure of these projects will depend on the type of
organizational structure adopted.9 The Urban Land Institutes study
revealed that the control and power vested in POAs could be viewed
along a continuum of preferability. The continuum is composed of
the following kinds of associations: automatic membership associa-
tions with mandatory membership and with each lot governed by
affirmative and negative covenants and restrictions;' 0 optional associa-
tions with nonmandatory membership and no provision for assess-
ments that run with the land;1 discretionary associations with mem-
bership at the association's discretion and covenants that do not
purport to burden the land with assessments; 2 and, dubs that are not
provided for in the covenants or other documents affecting the title
to land with membership at the homeowner's option subject to the
discretion of the club management.13 The mechanism found by the
Urban Land Institute to guarantee most effectively the continued
viability of the project is an automatic membership association built
on a system of restrictive and affirmative covenants that are binding on
every property owner.
Restrictive covenants governing the use of land are a familiar con-
cept of property law and present few theoretical problems unless they
are found to be oppressive, contrary to public policy, or a restriction
on the alienability of land.14 Restrictive covenants governing archi-
tectural styles and the permissible uses of a particular parcel of land
have generally been accepted as useful tools in land use planning and
8. Id.
9. Id. at ix.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 3
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 703-46 (P. Rohan ed. abr. ed.
1968); H. TIFr-ANy, 3 REAL PROPERTY 417-517 (3d ed. 1939); 2 AMERICAN LAw
oF PROPERTY 335-400 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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control.15 Restrictive covenants are considered a particularly useful
tool in the case of lake community developments.10 The question for
the developer, and ultimately the property owner, is not the desir-
ability of such restrictions, but rather how they are created and
whether they will be continuous, enforceable and uniform.'7
Attaching restrictions to one parcel of property presents few prob-
lems. A host of problems are encountered, however, when a developer
attempts to create a uniform set of restrictions for an entire subdi-
vision that are enforceable by the developer and subsequently by the
POA and individual lot owners.18 There are four potential combina-
tions of persons that could be involved in the enforcement of a promise
regarding a parcel of land: (1) plaintiff is the original promisee or
initial beneficiary of a promise and defendant is the original promisor;
(2) plaintiff is the original promisee or initial beneficiary, but de-
fendant is an assignee of the original promisor; (3) plaintiff claims
the benefited land under or through the original promisee or bene-
ficiary and defendant is the original promisor; and (4) neither plain-
tiff nor defendant were parties to the original promise.10 Given the
complexity of a large-scale subdivision and the refusal of most courts
to enforce covenants against parties who either were not original
parties to the promise or who took the property without notice of the
restrictions, 20 the developer, as well as the prospective property owner,
needs assurance that the method used will insure the uniform en-
forcement of the restrictions.
15. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55
hMiNN. L Iv. 167 (1970); Consigny & Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a
Rapidly Urbanizing Area, 1958 Wis. L. Rv. 612; Lundberg, Restrictive Cov-
enants and Land Use Control: Private Zoning, 34 MONT. L. Rlv. 199 (1973).
16. Deed restrictions used to control land use in artificial lake subdivisions
supplement underlying shoreland zoning controls by more specifically regu-
lating land use. They are not subject to the constitutional attacks that plague
regulations, such as uncompensated taking of private property and dis-
crimination. They are more permanent than public regulations which may
be changed at the political whim of the governing body.
Kusler, Artificial Lakes and Land Subdivisions, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 369, 417-18
[hereinafter cited as Kusler].
17. H&,-,mBooic 309.
18. Id. at 309-13.
19. Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 8 J. LAw & Ecox. 133,
141-42 (1965).
20. 2 Am MECANq LAw OF PRoPERTY, supra note 14, at 432.
[Vol. 8:169
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The method most commonly employed to achieve this result is em-
bodied in the doctrine of reciprocal negative easements:
When an owner subdivides a parcel of land for sale in lots and
it is shown that he intended at that time, to subject all of the
lots to a uniform set of restrictions, the common law doctrine is
that, as soon as the first lot is sold subject to such restrictions, the
rest of the land (still in the subdivider's hand) is automatically
restricted by the same restrictions.21
An intention to subject the subdivision to a common set of restric-
tions may be inferred from the fact that most of the lots were sold
subject to the same restrictions.22 The best way to show a common
scheme, however, is to file a declaration of restrictions along with the
recorded plat of the proposed subdivision before the first lot is sold.23
Courts have held that the uniform restrictions will automatically
attach to the remaining lands held by the common grantor and are
thus enforceable against a subsequent purchaser who takes with notice
of the restrictions.24 Courts will enforce the restrictions against a sub-
sequent purchaser even though the restrictions were not specifically
mentioned in his deed, since an inspection of the grantor-grantee
index will disclose the earlier conveyance by the common grantor.
Thus, a subsequent purchaser has constructive notice of the uniform
scheme of restrictions that negates any defense that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice.25 When such a general plan
exists, anyone who purchases a lot with knowledge of the scheme may
enforce the restrictions against any prior or subsequent purchaser.2 6
Cases have also held that restrictions are enforceable by and against
subsequent purchasers even though the restrictions have not been
recorded in the deed of every lot sold by the common, grantor and
even though the restrictions may not be exactly the same for each lot
included in the common plan.21
21. HANDBOOK 310.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, at 432.
25. Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955); Sanborn v. Mc-
Lean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1364, 1371
(1949). Contra, Smith v. Community Synagogue, 128 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct.
1953) (holding that notice could only be based on what was in the chain of title).
26. TiFFANY, supra note 14, at 501. See, e.g., Cejka v. Korn, 127 S.W.2d 786
(Mo. App. 1939); Reed v. Hazard, 187 Mo. App. 547, 174 S.W. 111 (1915).
27. Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955); Sanborn v. Mc-
Lean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). One commentator has suggested
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Although courts are generally willing to allow parties bound by
the common plan to modify the restrictions, 28 it has been held that
when the common grantor has reserved the right to modify freely
the restrictions concerning any of the properties in a subdivision,
this reservation prevents finding a common plan and prevents the
lot owners from enforcing the restrictions among themselves.20 Courts
are also unwilling to apply the doctrine of reciprocal negative ease-
ments to lands owned by the common grantor at the time the restric-
tions were recorded but not included in the original scheme of re-
strictions.30 This limitation applies to staged developments even
though the developer fully intended to include the other lands in the
common scheme at a later time.31
The interest of lake community developments in affirmative cov-
enants stems from the desirability and necessity of having mandatory
maintenance assessments. While courts have readily enforced restric-
tive covenants, when properly created and not contrary to public
policy, they have been reluctant to enforce affirmative covenants
running with the land.3 2 English courts held that before an affirma-
tive covenant would be enforced, especially against a subsequent
purchaser, the court had to find an intention that the covenant was
to run with the land, that the covenant "touched or concerned" the
land, and that there was privity of estate between the parties.33 Addi-
tional problems developed because of the difficulty of obtaining relief
that there only has to be a "reasonable uniformity" in the applicability of the re-
strictions. POWELL, supra note 14, at 726. See, e.g., Elliott v. Keely, 121 Ind.
App. 529, 98 N.E.2d 374 (1951); Margate Park Protective Ass'n v. Abate, 22
N.J. Super. 550, 92 A.2d 110 (Ch. Div. 1952); Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 101
P.2d 391 (1940).
28. See, e.g., Lakeshore Estates Recreational Area, Inc. v. Turner, 481 S.W.2d
572 (Mo. 1972) (single lot modification of the original restrictions by agreement
of the parties).
29. Suttle v. Bailey, 68 N.M. 283, 361 P.2d 325 (1961); Mauro v. Tomasullo,
28 Misc. 2d 66, 212 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Rose v. Jasima Realty Corp.,
218 App. Div. 646, 219 N.Y.S. 222 (1925); Brighton by the Sea v. Rivkin, 201
App. Div. 726, 195 N.Y.S. 198 (1922); Maples v. Horton, 239 N.C. 394, 80
S.E.2d 38 (1953); Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15, 200 S.E. 918 (1939); Price
v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 209, 56 A.2d 215 (1948); Keith v. Seymour, 335 S.W.2d
862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
30. HANDBOOK 313 n.16. See, e.g., Gammons v. Kennett Park Dev. Corp., 30
Del. Oh. 525, 61 A.2d 391 (1948); Craven County v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953).
31. See cases cited note 30 supra.
32. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
33. Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 69 (1583).
[Vol. 8:169
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both at law or in equity.34 Without a means for imposing mandatory
payments that run with the land and that can be used to support
common open spaces and facilities, most of the other restrictions or
plans for a subdivision would be pointless.35
Courts have long recognized the principle of an "equitable charge"
against the land, meaning that "when a person acquired land know-
ing that a prior owner parted with the land only on condition that
certain payments will be made to some designated beneficiary, such
person cannot, in good conscience, be suffered to retain the land and
fail to make the payments."5 8 In enforcing covenants for the payment
of annual maintenance assessments, however, American courts use
the doctrine of equitable servitude to impose affirmative obligations
that run with the land.3 In Neponsit Property Owners' Association
v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank38 the Court of Appeals of New
York held that a covenant to pay an annual maintenance assessment
was an affirmative duty running with the land that could be secured
by placing an equitable lien on the land. The court found that the
covenant did in fact "touch and concern" the land:
For full enjoyment in common by the defendant and other prop-
erty owners of these easements or rights, the roads and public
places must be maintained. In order that the burden of main-
taining public improvements should vest upon the land benefited
by the improvements, the grantor exacted from the grantee of
the land with its appurtenant easement or right of enjoyment a
covenant that the burden of paying the cost should be insepar-
ably attached to the land which enjoys the benefit.39
34. For an excellent summary of development problems see HAN-DBOOK 314-20.
35. Id. at 222-32.
36. Id. at 316. "An equitable charge can be attached to land not only as an
incident of a gratuitous transfer but also as an incident to a conveyance for a
valuable consideration. The equitable charge need not be a single lump sum pay-
ment, it can be an annual recurring obligation." Id. The remedy of the injured
party i- to place an equitable len against the land in rem, since the equitable
charge is not a personal obligation against the ownmer of the burdened land. Id. at
317.
37. This line of reasoning has been criticized as misleading since the equitable
servitude cases apply to affirmative obligations other than the payment of money.
The primary problem is that courts of equity are not willing to enforce the affirma-
tive obligation as a personal obligation by issuing a mandatory injunction to
require performance of the affirmative duty unless the covenant fulfills the formal
requirements at law. For a full discussion of these problems see id. at 317-18.
38. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
39. Id. at 260, 15 N.E.2d at 797. Other state courts have also upheld affirma-
tive covenants for the payment of maintenance assessments as an equitable lien
19741
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Although it has long been clear that both the original developer
and subsequent purchasers can enforce the restrictive and affirmative
covenants, it was not clear until Neponsit that a POA could do so.40
The Neponsit court found that the POA possessed no title to any of
the lands within the restricted area and hence lacked the technical
"privity of estate." It held, however, that the association derived the
right to enforce the covenants from the members of the association
as their agent or representative.- The only apparent flaw in this
theory is that the POA is entirely dependent on the right of the prop-
erty owners to enforce the covenants, and if this right should fail for
any reason, the right of the association to enforce will also fail.42 This
result follows from the theory expressed by courts that, even though
slight deviations from the uniformity of a common scheme of restric-
tions will not impair general enforcement,43 a general scheme of
restrictions must be universal to be reciprocal. Unless the restrictions
are reciprocal some lots will be burdened without being benefited. 44
against the land. See, e.g., Henlopen Acres v. Potter, 127 A.2d 476 (Del. Ch.
1956); Phillips v. Smith, 240 Iowa 863, 38 N.W.2d 87 (1949); Metryclub Gardens
Ass'n v. Council, 36 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1948); Wehr v. Rolan Park Co., 143
Md. 384, 122 A. 363 (1923); Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d
418 (1958); Stephens v. Lisk, 240 N.C. 289, 82 S.E.2d 99 (1954); Queen City
Park Ass'n v. Gale, 110 Vt. 110, 3 A.2d 529 (1939); Noremac, Inc. v. Centre
Hill Court, 164 Va. 151, 178 S.E. 877 (1935); Rodruck v. Sand Point Mainte-
nance Comm., 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Wetzel, 212 Wis. 100, 248 N.W. 791 (1933); HANDBOOK 319. There is still
reluctance to recognize affirmative covenants running with the land as a personal
obligation. See, e.g., Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d
911 (Ch. Div. 1971); Furness v. Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (Ch.
Div. 1960). See also Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11
Ill. App. 2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
40. HANDBooK 319.
41. 278 N.Y. at 262, 15 N.E.2d at 798. Two other theories are suggested to
allow the POA to enforce the covenants: that the association is a third-party bene-
ficiary to the original land sales contract; and that the association is an assignee
of the rights of the developer. Both of these theories, however, have been found
to be lacking in some respect. See HANDBOOK 309-10.
42. HANDBOOK 311.
43. Elliot v. Keely, 121 Ind. App. 529, 98 N.E.2d 374 (1951); Margate Park
Protective Ass'n v. Abate, 22 N.J. Super. 550, 92 A.2d 110 (Ch. Div. 1952);
Rowe v. May, 44 N.M. 264, 101 P.2d 391 (1940).
44. The court in Kliem v. Sisters of Charity, 101 N.J. Eq. 761, 766, 139 A. 174,
176 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927), expressed the underlying theory as follows:
A general scheme of restrictions, to be effective and enforceable, must have
certain characteristics. It must... apply to all lots of like character brought
within the scheme. Unless it be universal, it cannot be reciprocal. If it be not
[Vol. 8:169
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Thus, purchasers of lots in a new development should make sure that
the developer has established the proper legal foundation for the POA.
I. GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT AND SoME ALTERNATIVES
The ability to enforce the common scheme of restrictions is essen-
tial if a POA is to function successfully. Enforcement of a common
scheme of restrictions, however, is not the association's sole function.
Once the developer has relinquished control of a project, the POA
has the burden of providing necessary facilities and an organizational
structure for the community. It is this dichotomous role-the POA
serving both as a form of community government and as a means of
control by the developer-that poses unique problems for the property
owners and members of the association.
POAs are a favored method of organizing subdivisions and new
communities since
•.. pre-existing local governments tend to approve of it because
the association performs municipal-type services, assures that
common open spaces will be permanent, and guarantees that
maintenance will be paid by the benefited properties, rather than
from public funds. The developer favors the homes association
because it permits him to maintain a large portion of control
during the developmental period, while allowing him gradually
to develop residential participation and responsibility, so that
he may eventually withdraw from the project .... 4
Although other organizational forms are available, the Urban Land
Institute has recommended incorporation of the POA as a nonprofit
organization. 6 In fact, the Urban Land Institute urges developers to
incorporate the POA almost simultaneously with the recording of the
declaration of restrictions.47
By using the nonprofit corporation as the organizational form of
the POA, the developer can allow participation by lot purchasers on
reciprocal, then it must as a neighborhood scheme fall, for the theory which
sustains a scheme or plan of this character is that the restrictions are a
benefit to all. The consideration to each lot owner for the imposition of the
restriction upon his lot is that the same restrictions are imposed upon the lots
of others similarly situated. If the restrictions upon all lots similarly located
are not alike, or some lots are not subject to the restrictions, while others are,
then a burden would be carried by some owners without a corresponding
benefit. The burden follows the benefit, and, where there is no benefit,
there should be no burden.
45. New Towns 383-84 (footnotes omitted).
46. HANDBOOK 338-41.
47. Id. at 208-09.
1974]
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a one vote per lot basis, since membership in the association is man-
datory by force of the covenants. 4 The developer can retain control of
the POA, however, since most non-profit corporation statutes allow
different classes of voting membership.41 The developer can devise
a system of weighted voting so that each lot held by the developer
will be entitled to a proportionately greater vote than a lot conveyed
to a private property owner.50 Thus the developer's control will be
continued until 75% of the lots have been sold." Unless the devel-
oper retains control, especially during the initial stages, he may be
faced with an organization acting at cross purposes with his develop-
ment plan. 2
Retention of control by weighted voting may be desirable from the
developer's point of view, but do the property owners have some
claim for more equal participation in the decision making? This
question becomes especially important as the POA assumes increased
responsibilities and becomes less like a private enterprise and more
like a municipal corporation in providing community services and
facilities. In New Towns that employ POAs the problem, as one
author has indicated, has been that
Unlike the municipal corporation, the homes associations are
private; membership, at least in theory, is voluntary. Whereas
all residents of a municipality are members of the municipal
corporation, only residents with a property interest are members
of the homes association. The constitutional question, therefore,
48. Id. at 386-87.
49. Id. at 241.
50. Id.
51. Id. Although the Urban Land Institute recommends that the developer
set a date for termination of the weighted voting power, the developer could retain
control of the association for an indefinite period of time by requiring, as a pre-
condition to the sale of a lot on an installment basis, that the purchaser assign
his voting rights to the developer until the last installment has been paid.
52. Id. at 240-41. The notion of benevolent paternalism has also been used
and encouraged in the development of New Towns. As applied to them the argu-
ment is as follows:
If the nation is committed to the building of New Towns by private de-
velopers free of regulation, it seems unavoidable that we accept a develop-
mental period during which a "semi-democratic facade" prevails. Indeed,
the planning and construction of a New Town is such an expensive, compli-
cated process that there may be no feasible way to combine a developmental
period with meaningful resident participation.
New Towns 394,
[Vol. 8:169
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is whether the similarities of the homes association to a municipat
government require the application of constitutional require-
ments to them, despite their "private" character.53
As this same author suggests, the crucial problem is that the courts
have applied an equal protection analysis to private organizations
only in cases in which first amendment rights have been violated or
in which there has been racial discrimination.54 After discussing
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the "public area"55 and the
"public function ' 3 approaches, the author concludes "that New
Towns should be subject to equal protection standards in allocating
the franchise."57 Applying this theory, if a private organization has all
the characteristics of a town and its dominant character and purpose
is municipal, then the franchise should be open to all residents of the
New Town. 5
While courts may decide that the one unit/one vote allocation of
the franchise is constitutionally required when a New Town has
become an established operation, they may nonetheless permit control
by weighted voting during the early stages when the developer needs
53. New Towns at 402 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 402-03.
55. Id. at 403-04. The "public area" concept states that first amendment
rights may not be curtailed by application of state statutes to activity taking place
in areas that are essentially public in character. The problem is to decide what
characteristics will lead' to a finding that a particular area is sufficiently "public"
for first amendment purposes. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946). Some doubt has been cast on the continuing applicability of Logan
Valley by the recent Supreme Court decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972). See Note, Private Business Districts and the First Amendment: From
Marsh to Tanner, 7 URBA, L. ANN. 199 (1974).
56. New Towns 404-08. The "public function" doctrine used in racial dis-
crimination cases has two distinct elements: "the character of the conduct by
private parties" and "state involvement through delegation, complicity, or in-
action." Id. at 405. The basic premise of the doctrine is that "[c]onduct that is
formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so im-
pregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional
limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
57. New Towns 408-09.
58. Id. at 409. "Residents" in this situation would have to be equated with
persons who are domiciled in the New Town for voting purposes. This distinction
may become important in lake community developments in which a conflict may
arise between resident property owners and "weekend" property owners. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. North Shore Estates Ass'n, 384 Mich. 42, 179 N.W.2d 398 (1970).
19741
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to protect his investment.59 The developer could argue that during
the developmental stage only a "semi-democratic facade" is needed,
since the POA at that point "is intended to serve not as a general
governing body of the residents, but as an administrative device of
the developer."60 A distinction can also be drawn between New
Town associations that perform a wide variety of municipal functions,
and a limited purpose POA in a subdivision that performs only a single
function, such as providing sewers. 61 The criteria used to make the
distinction would include: (1) the extent of municipal services per-
formed by the association; (2) the size of the community in popula-
tion and area; (3) the importance of these services to the community;
and (4) whether the community served by the association "looks"
like a town.62 Arguably a limited purpose POA would not be sub-
ject to the one unit/one vote requirement. As previously mentioned,
most lake community developments are not begun with the intent of
creating a New Town. Nevertheless, it is arguable that, at least in
some of the larger developments, the variety and complexity of the
services and functions performed by the POA are in fact "public
functions" performed by a "private government."03
POAs in lake community developments are regarded by many as
the most effective means of providing community services and facili-
ties. Yet they do not always function as expected.64 Although there
may be few remedies available to individuals who purchase property
in a development that already has an established POA, especially dur-
ing the developmental stage when the developer has virtually complete
control, they may eventually find it desirable or even necessary to
change their mode of organization. Several alternatives are available.
To alleviate the financial inability of POAs to cope with problems of
59. New Towns 411.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 409 n.136.
62. Id.
63. Among the many functions that a POA can perform in a lake community
development are maintenance of common open spaces and facilities such as boat
docks, roads, sewers, recreational facilities, and water systems, and the provision
of such services as trash disposal, sanitation and police protection. Kusler 429.
64. POAs, while enabling a lot owner to hold common property and providing
services, may not adequately protect the health and safety of subdivision residents
or their interest in navigable waters. Litigation, general indifference, or lack of
funds, may transform a POA with broad powers into an organization unable to
provide adequate services or to prevent health hazards. Id.
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maintaining or expanding essential services, one commentator has sug-
gested that the lake community be incorporated as a third- or fourth-
class municipality.3 Thus, one lake community near Kansas City,
Missouri, found it advantageous to incorporate as a fourth-class city
and to shift responsibility for providing water services to the newly
created municipality. If the POA is a nonprofit corporation it could
enter into a contract with a nearby municipality to provide needed
services and facilities. 67 This alternative, however, assumes that there
is a local governmental unit capable of performing these functions.
Furthermore, making a contract with a nearby government because of
the POA's inability to meet the overwhelming capital cost of services
does not solve the problem since those in the development will still pay
for the services they receive under the contract; only the entity ad-
ministering the services will have changed.
Another alternative for property owners who find their POA un-
able to provide the necessary services and facilities is to take advantage
of state statutes that allow the creation of special districts with powers
similar to those of a POA.6s If a lake community is established in an
undeveloped rural county that cannot provide services and facilities,
use of the special district may be the only alternative.69 In the case
of new communities, however, there is the feeling that special districts
should be used only as an interim form of government until a munici-
pality can be created.70 Because special districts are governmental
65. Home owners' associations are needed to provide "private" common
services benefiting subdivision residents, but not the general public, such as
maintaining privately owned common park areas and club houses. They may
provide broader services if local units are incapable or unwilling to assume
responsibility. In most instances, however, local general-purpose government
units, may appropriately assume general responsibilities. In contrast to home
owners' associations, whose legal longevity may be perpetual but whose effec-
tive life may be limited, the continued existence of local governmental units
such as cities, villages, counties and towns is assured. Local units have a
public service tradition and an array of statutory powers. They can extend
roads, sewers and water. In addition, they may maintain dams and improve
lakes.
Id. at 432 (footnote omitted).
66. HANDBOOK 69. See also Kusler 430.
67. HANDBOOK 341.
68. Id. at 13 n.13. See also Volpert, Creation and Maintenance of Open Spaces
in Subdivisions: Another Approach, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 830 (1965).
69. U.S. ADvisoRY CONIM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AmERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 77 (1969).
70. ArIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, NEW TowNs: POLICY PROBLEMS I REGU-
LATING DEVELOPMENT 54 (1970). See also Mullarkey, The Evolution of a New
Community: Problems of Government, 6 HARv. J. LEGIs. 462 (1969).
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bodies with the power to tax and issue bonds, some developers abuse
the system and use special districts as a tool to raise capital for
their projects.7 1 It is also important to note the distinction made by
courts between the ability of special districts to levy assessments for
local improvements that benefit specific land and the ability to levy
general ad valorem taxes for projects that benefit the entire district.12
In spite of these drawbacks, property owners in lake community
developments may wish to form special improvement districts that
can assume responsibility for maintenance of roads and recreational
facilities.73 Of particular importance to property owners in lake com-
munity developments are statutes that permit formation of sanitary
districts to provide shoreland maintenance.74 A Michigan statute
allows owners of property abutting a lake to form a special lake im-
provement district authorized to perform a variety of functions.75 An
effective POA could accomplish many of these same objectives.
III. POLICY AND PLANNING PROBLEMs
In the initial planning stages, builders of large lake communities
must consider a wide range of problems. These include the develop-
ment's potential effect on the environment and the surrounding
community as well as the need to provide adequate services and facili-
ties. If developers do not provide comprehensive plans, property
owners may subsequently be faced with solving many of these prob-
lems on their own.
71. Willoughby, The Quiet Alliance, 38 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 72 (1965). See also
Comment, The Use of Special Assessment Districts and Independent Special
Districts as Aids in Financing Private Land Development, 53 CALIF. L. RV. 364
(1965).
72. When general tax funds are used to support current maintenance, the fa-
cilities maintained must be open to use by the general public and can not be con-
fined to the residents of a particular development. A special district can perform
the same basic functions as a POA only if the district can tax its own residents for
current maintenance of its facilities. Some doubt may yet remain as to the pro-
priety of such arn application of tax dollars when the power of government is
made available for a purpose that is essentially local and private in nature. HAND-
LooK 13. Thus, while assessments for sewers and water may be permissible, assess-
ments for building a public library may be prohibited. See, e.g., Brightwell v.
Kansas City, 153 Mo. App. 519, 134 S.W. 87 (1911); Heavens v. King County
Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 404 P.2d 453 (1965).
73. See Clem v. Cooper Communitites, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 579, 581 (E.D. Ark.
1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-701 (1967).
74. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.30-.316 (1957); Kusler 430.
75. MINI. STAT. ANN. § 11.419 (1968).
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Ecological considerations should be a primary concern of a lake
community, since environmental problems will affect not only the
quality of the project itself, but also the surrounding countryside.76
The construction of large-scale lake developments has been opposed
by conservationists, land use planners, and the general public be-
cause of potential pollution problems, damage to the ecology, and
deterioration of scenic beauty.77 Despite concern for the environment,
many people purchase lots in lake community developments because
of the desire to build second homes or to have access to recreational
facilities.78 It has been estimated that 625,000 recreational lots were
sold in 197 1I1 This rapid expansion concerns land use planners
because of the apparent emphasis placed by developers on land as a
speculative commodity rather than a natural resource. Compounding
this error is the use of improper development methodss0 that cul-
minate in rural slums:5 Local residents, who should be most con-
cerned with the environmental impact of such developments on their
local community, often fail to act because they feel that these develop-
ments will have a beneficial impact on the local economy.S2
Property owners in lake developments need to concern themselves
with environmental issues on a more practical level. The owners
should be aware that the conversion of a stream valley into an arti-
ficial lake has a tremendous effect on the surrounding ecology:83
In contrast, [with natural lakes], water quality problems for arti-
ficial lakes may not emerge until after lots are purchased. Pur-
chasers of lots on a newly created lake may observe woods, dear
water, few buildings, and much of the shoreland vegetation in-
tact. However, the lake is a new and unpredictable feature on
76. Comment, Land Development and the Environment: The Subdivision Map
Act, 5 PACIFic L.J. 55 (1974).
77. Kusler 371.
78. Id.
79. THr UsE or LAND 263.
80. Id. at 275.
81. Id. at 276.
82. [Blecause large-scale development is new, local residents and officials of
rural localities often lack experience in responding to it. They are likely to
recognize that new development means income, in purchases at local stores,
in construction by local contractors, in mortgages by local banks and services
by local lawyers and surveyors.
THE Usr OF LAND 279. See also Comment, Preserving Rural Land Resources:
The California Westside, I EcoLooY L.Q. 330, 333 (1971).
83. Kusler 384.
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the landscape. If the stream picked for a reservoir carries a signi-
ficant loading of silt, the reservoir may be quickly filled and des-
troyed for recreational use. The damming of a free flowing
stream reduces its ability to assimilate large quantities of nutri-
ents. The subdivision of shoreland areas is often at a higher den-
sity than for natural lakes and can supply a larger quantity of
pollutants.84
Even if the site for the lake has been properly chosen, poorly planned
roads, destruction of ground cover, and high density settlement can
cause erosion and sedimentation of the lakes.85 Not only will a poorly
planned artificial lake affect the future quality of the lake community,
the haphazard damming o natural streams will also affect down-
stream riparian property owners.88
Another major problem is the impact of the development on the
county in which the development is located or on a neighboring town.
The initial reaction on the part of local residents may be pleasurable
anticipation of a boosted economy. They may be unaware of
future costs-the costs of providing roads, sewers and other services
for scattered projects, the personal costs of congestion, changed life-
styles and disruption of the countryside, and the social costs of a new
urban and affluent population settling among small town people8?
Although careful planning by the developer will alleviate much of
the financial impact that a new development may have on the local
community, a recent study has indicated that in the long run a new
large-scale development will cost the surrounding community more
to provide services than it receives in additional revenues.88 A study
of Hollymead Phase I, an 800-unit planned development in Albemarle
County, Virginia, found that, because of the nature of the develop-
ment, the tax base, and the political, social and economic structure
of the county, the project would cost the county approximately
$101,745 annually in services and capital expenditures over the rev-
enues obtained from the development8 9
84. Id. at 385.
85. THE USE OF LAND 277.
86. Kusler 422 n.204. Liability for injuries caused by failure of an improperly
constructed dam will fall on the association once it has received title from the
developer. Id.
87. THE USE OF LAND 279.
88. See generally T. MULLER & G. DAwsON, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF RESIDEN-
TIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY (1972).
89. Id. at 81-84.
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The Hollymead study raises the question of how a developer of a
lake community can be compelled to provide services and facilities
necessary for the continued existence of the community. The problem
is complicated by several underlying considerations. First, a local
municipality cannot be compelled to supply services beyond its bound-
aries to an area where it has not previously extended its services. 90
Secondly, a developer is obligated to pay only the cost of providing
facilities needed to service his subdivision.9' It seems that a developer
cannot be compelled to pay for excess facilities required to meet the
needs of a rapidly developing area.92 Thus, the question becomes
one of remedies available to local units of government to compel
developers to provide adequate services and facilities in neighboring
lake communities.
To lessen the negative impact of new developments on existing
units of local government, the Hollymead study suggests that a county
either attempt to channel new developments into areas where facili-
ties are under-utilized, or require developers to contribute to the cost
of providing capital facilities.9' The second proposal is supported by
cases permitting a municipality to require payment of fees or dedica-
tion of land to the municipality by the developer as a precondition
to approval of the subdivision plat.94
A similar statutory approach requires that the developer post a
performance bond to guarantee the completion of facilities before
local approval of the development plan is given.9  The purpose of
performance bonds is not to punish the developer or to unduly benefit
a local government, "but to assure those who purchase homes in a
90. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Public Service Comm'n, 268 Wis. 116, 66
N.W.2d 716 (1954). See also D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENvIRON-
MENT 398-407 (2d ed. 1971).
91. G. LFcoE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 346 (1966).
92. Id.
93. T E USE OF LAND 229-30.
94. See, e.g., In re Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup.
Ct. 1931). Contra, Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of East Detroit, 358 Mich. 387,
1 ()0 N.W.2d 301 (1960). See also Comment, Subdivision Regulation: Requiring
Dedication of Park Land or Payment of Fees as a Condition Precedent to Plat
Approval, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 310.
95. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11612 (Deering Cur. Supp. 1973);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 25.09 (1955); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 41, § 81U(1973); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 64.060, 89.410 (1969). See also Yearwood, Perform-
ance Bonding For Subdivision Improvements, 11 CURRENT MuN. PROB. 387
(1970).
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new subdivision that they will receive the public improvements that
were a large part of the inducement to purchase lots and homes in
that development."' 90
The use of performance bonds reflects the trend toward enactment
of stricter subdivision control laws in order to regulate land develop-
ment.97 Recent Vermont statutes require that a permit be taken out
before "a person may sell or offer for sale any interest in a subdivision
or before the commencement of development."0 8 In reviewing a permit
application, a district environmental commission is required to con-
sider certain factors, including the effect of a new development on
local educational services and other municipal and governmental
services, and the development's conformance with state, regional and
local land use plans.09 Under recent California statutes, a developer
is required to submit a tentative subdivision map, comply with local
ordinances and then file a final subdivision map.100 This statute re-
quires that "such street work and utilities to be installed, or agreed
to be installed by the subdivider ... as are necessary for the general
use of the lot owners in the subdivision and local neighborhood traffic
and drainage needs as a condition precedent to the approval and
acceptance of the final map thereof."'01 Although local governments
are often reluctant to engage in extensive regulation, many have, on
the basis of this language, imposed obligations on developers to com-
plete improvements for future residents of the proposed develop-
ment.102
Although subdivision control laws and performance bonds are po-
tentially effective tools whereby local units of government may com-
pel developers to provide needed services and facilities, these remedies
will not greatly aid property owners faced with local governments
that are unwilling to enforce regulatory provisions. Most courts have
held that the purpose of performance bonds is to ensure that the im-
provements will not have to be made at the public expense, contra-
96. Yearwood, supra note 95, at 388.
97. See, e.g., Freifich & Levi, Model Regulations for the Control of Land Sub-
division, 36 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1971).
98. Levy, Vermont's New Approach to Land Development, 59 A.B.A.J. 1158
(1973).
99. Id.
100. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11531, 11535 (Deering Cum. Supp. 1973).
101. Id. § 11511.
102. Comment, Land Development and the Environment, supra note 76, at 63.
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dicting the view that performance bonds are designed for the benefit
of subsequent subdivision lot owners. 03 Unless they are specifically
mentioned as third-party beneficiaries and obligees of the bond, prop-
erty owners may not require enforcement of the performance bond. °'0
Neither may they proceed against a title insurance company on the
theory that perfect fee simple title was not conveyed because the city
approved the subdivision map without first requiring a bond to ensure
installation of promised improvements.,05
In the absence of effective state and local regulations, developers
may start a project with assets that are insufficient to provide essential
facilities, hoping to defer capital expenditures until sufficient revenues
have been obtained from the sale of lots.'0 G The question then is
what means may be employed to insure that developers complete
promised improvements and facilities. One suggested method is to re-
quire the developer, by means of either public regulation or private
contract, to place a portion of the price of each lot in escrow until the
improvements are completed.107 In certain cases purchasers will be
able to bring an action under the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act.'0 8 The Act lessens the purchaser's burden in proving
fraud and deceit in the sale of lots. 0 9 A purchaser may bring an
action up to one year after discovery that the required property re-
port contained untrue statements or omissions, but not more than
three years after his purchase."10
Although the provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act may be adequate to protect a purchaser when the developer has
103. See, e.g., Ragghianti v. Sherwin, 196 Cal. App. 2d 345, 16 Cal. Rptr. 583
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Evola v. Wendt, 170 Cal. App. 2d 21, 338 P.2d 498
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Gordon v. Robinson Homes, Inc., 342 Mass. 529, 174
N.E.2d 381 (1961); Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500, 173 A.2d 391
(1961).
104. University City ex rel. Mackey v. Frank Miceli & Sons Realty & Bldg. Co.,
347 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1961).
105. Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (1951).
106. The problem has been, at least until recently, that land developers have
been able to use accounting methods to delay expenditures for capital improve-
ments. For a discussion of the problem and the recent changes in accounting
practices see THE USE OF LAND 283-92.
107. Id. at 292.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
109. For a full discussion of the remedies provided under the Act see Morris,
supra note 5, at 349-54.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1970).
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dearly committed fraud, the greater problem for property owners
arises when the improvements made are inadequate to serve the full
community. This possibility is particularly acute in lake community
developments in which the primary use of the land is recreational,
and permanent development by lot owners may be delayed past the
statute of limitations provision of the Act."' The developer, in a
1500-2000 lot development, may only provide a sewage or fresh water
plant that will be adequate for the first 500 families that happen to
build homes on their lots. Due to the recreational land use pattern
of lake community developments, these facilities may be adequate
for some time, and may fulfill the developer's disclosure obligations
under the Act. 212 After the developer has finally disassociated himself
from the project, however, the property owners' association may sud-
denly find itself faced with a large capital outlay because of the de-
veloper's underplanning215
CONCLUSION
Lake community developments have not always proved to be the
peaceful, problem free haven the purchasers hoped for. Far greater
attention must be paid to proposals for the creation of these new
communities if disruption of nearby residents and the environment
is to be avoided. Potential purchasers of lots in such developments
must approach the transaction more carefully and be made keenly
aware of problem areas. Before investing their money in a new lake
community, purchasers should determine whether the developer has
established a proper organizational structure for the community,
whether he has planned comprehensively, and whether he is willing
and able to carry out his obligations. These steps must be taken in
order to guarantee that lot owners and the surrounding community
111. Morris, supra note 5, at 351.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1705 (1970).
113. Traditionally, assessments in communities with home owners' associations
are designed to generate sufficient revenues to sustain "(1) current expenditures
for maintenance, labor, supervision and services, ordinary repairs and debt service
on all the common assets and facilities; (2) depreciation; (3) casualty and liabil-
ity insurance; [and] (4) working capital to meet contingencies as they arise ...."
LEFCOE, supra note 91, at 1138. Whether the assessments charged property owners
can meet the above needs, provide for additional capital outlays for new facilities,
and still be kept within the limits a middle-income property owner can afford is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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will not be left with the duty and expense of solving problems that
should have been handled by the developer.
One solution lies in the enactment of stricter subdivision control
laws and enforcement of their provisions by local governments. An-
other is to expand state and federal remedies available to lot pur-
chasers. Including property owners as obligees under performance
bond statutes, or extending the fraud and disclosure provisions of
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, could assure purchasers
of complete protection against irresponsible developers. These al-
ternatives can help guarantee the responsible planning and develop-
ment of new lake communities.
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